President Donald Trump begins a second term that promises to be crucial for Latin America. Much has been said about his 2024 victory, his potential foreign policy and his unconventional personal traits. Most specialists in the United States and the region predict a very stormy horizon, warning about the extremely delicate situation that may unfold.
Throughout history, there have been difficult moments – even serious ones—regarding the relations between the United States and Latin America. The latest is Trump’s threat to seize the Panama Canal, which he said he would do while criticizing China’s role in managing the trade channel in his January 20 inaugural address.
I aim here to point out what Latin America has done to handle these threats despite the existing asymmetry of power and Washington’s recurrent habit of employing “sticks.”
At the beginning of the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan launched his “low-intensity conflict” in Central America, in response to which, by 1983, governments in Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela created the Contadora Group (which was later joined by Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay as a Support grouping).
Contadora, which had the endorsement of the European Community of the time, contributed decisively to peace in Central America.
In 1996, the US Congress approved the Helms-Burton Act, whose principle of extraterritoriality sought to hinder Cuba’s economic relations with foreign companies and investments. The recently created Rio Group (the four from Contadora, the four from the Support group, plus Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Bolivia, a representative from Central America, and another from the Caribbean) requested that the Inter-American Juridical Committee of the Organization of American States examine the Act. The Committee noted that the Helms-Burton was not in accordance with international law.
On September 11, 2001, in response to the terrorist attacks in the United States, Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith proposed in a September 20 draft memo a surprise attack in South America (allegedly, the Argentine-Brazilian-Paraguayan Triple Frontier). In response to this, in 2002, with the active role of Buenos Aires, the “3 (Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay) plus 1 (United States)” format was designed: the intelligence findings of the three countries would be shared with Washington.
The central issue was to prevent the tri-border area from becoming a stage for the “war on terrorism,” to preserve a margin of autonomy, and to ensure the confidence of the United States.
In 2003, at the UN Security Council, Chile and Mexico, with different governing coalitions, maintained a principled position based on their respective national interest in the face of the United States attempting to use a 1991 resolution to launch a second invasion of Iraq.
Finally, Washington eluded a defeat at the Council and organized the so-called “coalition of the willing” to attack Iraq. In the end, there was no retaliation from Washington, as the Executive finally signed an Investment Incentive Agreement with Mexico that year and Congress approved the Chile-United States free trade agreement.
In April 2008, the Pentagon decided to relaunch the Fourth Fleet, which had been deactivated in 1950. In response, at the initiative of Brazil, the South American Defense Council was created in 2008 to establish a regional security community and to curtail a US military expansion of forward operation locations in South America.
These examples show how, under difficult conditions and amid highly challenging issues, the region acted; it gave concrete answers to US declarations, laws and measures.
The use of institutionalized multilateral and ad hoc minilateral (the multilateralism of the few) fora was fruitful. The different ideological nature of the governments did not affect the possibility of identifying common interests, whether for altruistic or instrumental reasons.
By now it looks like the incoming Trump administration will focus the inter-American agenda on issues such as tariffs, migration, drug trafficking and the use of force. Perhaps on the tariff question, Latin American action could be taken with Europe, China, and India at the World Trade Organization to restrict Washington’s arbitrariness.
Regarding migration, the rules of international law, the record of decisions by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the resolutions by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights that prohibit mass expulsions could be invoked, as well as recourse to the International Organization for Migration, the International Court of Justice and the Inter-American Juridical Committee to prevent and condemn the abuses of Trump’s announced “mass deportation.”
In 2025, on the 25th anniversary of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, some countries in the region could call a summit to address the issue that affects the entire continent and, at the same time, urge the United States to ratify the 1997 Inter-American Convention on Firearms given the lethality generated in Latin America by the trade in small arms from the US.
Finally, there is the issue of the use of force. It is essential not to attract international conflicts or tolerate violent pronouncements about the region by senior US officials: the long inter-state peace period in Latin America is an asset that has been achieved and there is no excuse for putting it at risk.
In addition, most nations in the region have managed their bilateral relations with China both prudently and pragmatically. Washington’s fixation with Beijing is due to a traditional conundrum of great powers: the dilemma between resources and commitments.
During the Cold War, the United States deployed multiple resources (investment, aid, trade) in the area and thus claimed anti-Soviet Union and anti-communist commitments at the diplomatic, military and material levels.
Today, and in relation to China, the US provides quite fewer resources while demanding more commitments.
As the countries in the area are unwilling to break trade, financial and assistance ties with China, one of the region’s top foreign investors, Trump’s second administration only dangles threats and sanctions. His latest threat concerns taking control of the Panama Canal.
Preceding experiences should help conceive actions for the future. There will be nations that want to act together, sometimes many, other times few. But President Trump will most probably encounter less resignation and more resistance from Latin America if he tries to coerce the region with such a negative agenda.
